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A JUDICIAL RETROSPECTIVE: SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS BY THE
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT FROM 1991 THROUGH 2011
Justice Robert L. Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas Supreme Court has blazed new trails in Arkansas juris-
prudence in the last two decades with a bevy of significant opinions. The
impact of these opinions has been felt not only in Arkansas but across the
nation, particularly in the areas of individual privacy rights and term limits
for United States representatives and senators. There have also been opin-
ions dealing with separation of powers, the inadequacy and inequality of
public education, prior restraint of the press, expanded rights under the Ar-
kansas Constitution, class actions, and tort reform. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to highlight many of those opinions, while commenting on their im-
pact in Arkansas and beyond.
Of note is the fact that in 2008, the Arkansas Supreme Court was
ranked second best in the nation for state supreme courts by a study entitled
"Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High Courts?"' The report was
issued by the University of Chicago and was based on state supreme courts
as they were composed between 1998 and 2000.2 Three law professors pre-
pared the report: Eric D. Posner of the University of Chicago Law School,
Stephen J. Choi of the New York University Law School, and Mitu Gulati
of the Duke University Law School.' The final score was a composite based
on productivity of the justices in issuing opinions, independence from parti-
san pressures,4 and quality of opinions, including citation by other courts.
5
* Robert L. Brown is an Associate Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court. He is a
graduate of the University of the South (B.A. 1963), Columbia University (M.A. 1965), and
the University of Virginia (J.D. 1968).
I am indebted to my law clerks, Jaletta Long Smith and Mary Susan Formby; to my adminis-
trative assistant, Martha Patton; and to my summer interns, Fred Davis, Robin Wright, and
Chris Farrar, for their extensive research in preparation for this article.
1. Stephen 1. Choi, G. Mitu Gualti, and Eric A. Posner, Which States have the Best
(and Worst) High Courts? 22 (Univ. of Chi. Law of Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 405;
Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 217; Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Paper No. 236, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 130358.
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Arkansas, as of January 1, 2001, elects its judges on a non-partisan basis, which
should improve its composite score even more.
5. Choi, et al., supra note 1 at 9.
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II. THE CASES
A. Privacy Rights
Privacy rights of Arkansas citizens have been expanded over the past
decades in various contexts, but especially as applied to consensual sex in-
volving unmarried people in the privacy of their bedroom. Two cases par-
ticularly illustrate this point. In Jegley v. Picado,6 the issue presented to the
supreme court was the constitutionality of Arkansas's sodomy statute under
the Arkansas Constitution.7 The second case, Arkansas Department of Hu-
man Services v. Cole,8 addressed a recent initiated act by the people (Act 1)
that prohibited cohabitating, unmarried adults from adopting or fostering
children.9
The Jegley case is significant, because it dealt with (1) whether gay and
lesbian citizens had standing to challenge Arkansas's sodomy statute,
though they had not been charged with a precise violation; and (2) whether
enforcement of that statute violated those citizens' right to private sexual
intimacy under the Arkansas Constitution. On point one, the supreme
court held that the challenging citizens did have some reason to fear prose-
cution for violation of the sodomy statute, because they admitted to engag-
ing in the prohibited sexual acts, though charges had not yet been formally
brought against them." Thus, though uncharged, the court concluded that
they were branded as criminals and had standing to challenge the statute.'"
At the time Jegley was decided, the Supreme Court of the United States
had not recognized a fundamental right to engage privately in sodomy under
the United States Constitution. 3 Despite this, the Arkansas Supreme Court
noted that in the past, it had recognized protection of individual rights
"greater than the federal floor" established for certain rights. 4 For example,
the Arkansas Constitution does not specifically enumerate a right to privacy,
but article 2, section 2 guarantees citizens certain inherent and inalienable
rights, like the rights "of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquir-
ing, possessing and protecting property, and reputation; and of pursuing
their own happiness."' 5
6. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
7. Id. at 608-10, 80 S.W.3d at 334-35.
8. 2011 Ark. 145,. -S.W.3d .
9. Id. at 1, _S.W.3d at -
10. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 608, 80 S.W.3d at 334.
11. Id. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343.
12. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 343.
13. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
14. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349.
15. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1874); Jegley, 349 Ark. at 347, 80 S.W.3d at 627.
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The Arkansas Constitution also recognizes the right of persons to be
secure in the privacy of their own homes. 6 In Jegley, the court recognized
these constitutional protections and further observed that privacy is men-
tioned in more than eighty statutes enacted by the Arkansas General Assem-
bly and in the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure adopted by the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court. 7 After examining the Arkansas Constitution and Ar-
kansas statutes, rules, and case law, the court determined that the State had a
"rich and compelling tradition of protecting individual privacy and that a
fundamental right to privacy is implicit in the Arkansas Constitution."' 8 The
court held, as a result, that this fundamental right to privacy protects all pri-
vate, consensual, and noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between
adults. 9 Because the sodomy statute impinged on this fundamental right,
the statute could not survive unless the State could advance a compelling
state interest for doing so.2° The State conceded that there was no compel-
ling state interest sufficient to justify the statute, and the court, accordingly,
struck down the sodomy statute as an unconstitutional violation of the right
to privacy.2'
The court also held that the sodomy statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the Arkansas Equal Rights Amendment by treating same-
sex actors differently from opposite-sex actors.22 The State argued that the
sodomy statute did not violate the Equal Rights Amendment, because the
statute did not "make an impermissible gender classification or require un-
equal treatment between genders., 23  The court, though, recognized that
"there is no prohibition against members of opposite sexes engaging in the
same conduct" under the statute. 24 The State offered no reason why the
"conduct is injurious to the public welfare when engaged in by members of
the same sex but completely protected when engaged in by members of op-
posite sexes."25 Nor did the State offer sufficient reasoning to show that
principles of public morality and public interest "justify the prohibition of
consensual, intimate behavior between persons of the same sex. 2 6
The Jegley decision ultimately cobbled together a privacy right from
various elements of Arkansas law, similar to the "penumbra" used by the
16. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15.
17. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 628-31, 80 S.W.3d at 347-49.
18. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350-351.
19. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
20. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 350.
21. Id. at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 353-54.
22. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 353-54. See ARK. CONST. art. I, § 3 for the Arkansas Equal Rights
Amendment.
23. Jegley, 349 Ark. 632-33, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
24. Id. at 635, 80 S.W.3d at 352.
25. Id. at 636, 80 S.W.3d at 352.
26. Id. at 637, 80 S.W.3d at 353.
2012]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court of the United States in Griswold v. Connecticut.7 Yet what
is of note is that the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Jegley preceded
the Supreme Court of the United State's action in striking down a Texas
statute criminalizing the act of sodomy.28 The Court's decision under the
United States Constitution would be a year later and would cite Jegley as a
decision supporting the Court's new position.2
In 2011, the case of Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Cole"°
followed in the wake of Jegley. "On November 4, 2008, a ballot initiative
entitled 'An Act Providing That an Individual Who is Cohabiting Outside a
Valid Marriage May Not Adopt or Be a Foster Parent of a Child Less Than
Eighteen Years Old' [("Act 1")] was approved by fifty-seven percent of
Arkansas voters."'" Under Act 1, a person was "prohibited from adopting or
serving as a foster parent if that person was 'cohabiting with a sexual partner
outside of a marriage that is valid under the Arkansas Constitution and the
laws of this state."' 3 2 It applied equally to opposite-sex and same-sex indi-
viduals cohabiting in a same-sex or opposite-sex relationship.
33
A group of persons, including "unmarried adults who wish[ed] to foster
or adopt children in Arkansas, adult parents who wish[ed] to direct the adop-
tion of their biological children in the event of their incapacitation or death,
and the biological children of those parents (collectively 'Cole') filed a
complaint against the State of Arkansas, the Arkansas Attorney General, the
Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) and its Director, and the
Arkansas Child Welfare Agency Review Board (CWARB) and its Chairman
(collectively 'the State')., 34 The Family Action Committee moved to inter-
vene as an additional party in support of Act 1, and the motion was
granted.35
In the complaint, Cole asserted claims under the United States Consti-
tution and the Arkansas Constitution.36 The circuit court granted Cole's
motion for summary judgment and, citing Jegley, declared Act 1 unconstitu-
tional under the Arkansas Constitution.37
The State and the Family Action Committee argued on appeal that
adoption and fostering are not fundamental rights, as the circuit court had
27. 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
28. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
29. Id. at 576.
30. Ark. Dept. of Human Services v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, S.W.3d_.
31. Id. at 1, S.W.3d at _
32. Id. at 2, S.W.3d at _ (quoting Arkansas Adoption and Foster Care Act of 2008,
codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304(a) (Repl. 2009).
33. Id., S.W.3d at -
34. Id., S.W.3d at -
35. Id. at 4, S.W.3d at .
36. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 3-4, S.W.3d at .
37. Id. at 4, S.W.3d at .
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found them to be under the Arkansas Constitution.38 Cole countered that
because Act 1 prohibited cohabiting sexual partners from adopting and fos-
tering, her right to engage in private acts of sexual intimacy with her same-
sex partner or opposite-sex partner at home was substantially burdened.39
The supreme court agreed.4° It further found that there was no mean-
ingful distinction between the facts of this case and the facts of Jegley with
regard to the burden placed on the fundamental right to sexual privacy in the
home.4 ' The supreme court said: "In both situations, the penalty imposed is
a considerable burden on the right to intimacy in the home free from inva-
sive government scrutiny. '42 The court concluded that "under the Arkansas
Constitution, sexual cohabitors have the right to engage in private, consen-
sual, noncommercial intimacy in the privacy of their homes. 43
The supreme court also concluded that "unsuitable and undesirable
adoptive and foster parents" can be "weeded out" by DHS in the screening
process.44 But the choice inflicted on Cole by the State, according to the
court, was a direct and substantial burden.45 This is because Act 1 presented
Cole with the choice of either forgoing the ability to foster or adopt children,
should she live with a sexual partner, or risking intrusion into the bedroom
by the State to assure that cohabitors who adopt or foster were celibate.46
Because a fundamental right to privacy was involved, the supreme
court announced that the standard to be applied by the courts was height-
ened scrutiny.47 Using this standard, the court concluded that "because Act
1 exact[ed] a categorical ban against all cohabiting couples engaged in sex-
ual conduct, . . . [Act 1 was] not narrowly tailored or the least restrictive
means available to serve the State's compelling interest of protecting the
best interest of the child."" The court ultimately affirmed the circuit court's
ruling that Act 1 violated privacy rights under the Arkansas Constitution.49
In holding as it did, the supreme court emphatically endorsed privacy
rights for a second time under the Arkansas Constitution. It did so regard-
less of a prior expression of the popular will under Act 1 against the rights
of unmarried, cohabiting adults to adopt or foster.
38. Id. at 7, _ S.W.3d at .
39. Id. at 7-8, S.W.3d at .
40. Id. at 13-14, S.W.3d at .
41. Id. at 7, S.W.3d at .
42. Cole, 2011 at 13, _ S.W.3d at __
43. Id. at 13-14, S.W.3d at .
44. Id. at 17, S.W.3d at .
45. Id., _S.W.3d at .
46. Id., S.W.3d at-.
47. Id. at 19, S.W.3d at _
48. Cole, 2011 at 20, S.W.3d at
49. ld. at 26, S.W.3d at
20121
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B. Expanded Rights Involving Pretextual Arrests and Search and Seizure
In State v. Sullivan," the defendant was arrested for speeding, lack of
vehicle registration, no proof of insurance, and carrying a weapon, although
the actual motive for the arrest by law enforcement was to search for illegal
drugs.5' The search of Sullivan's vehicle incident to the arrest produced
methamphetamine, distribution supplies, and drug paraphernalia. Sullivan
was charged with the drug-and-weapons offenses as well as speeding. 2
At issue in the Sullivan case was the reasonableness of the pretextual
arrest in light of article 2, section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution, which
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and which is similar to
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.53 The Arkansas
Supreme Court held that pretextual arrests represent unreasonable police
conduct under the Arkansas Constitution and, therefore, warranted applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule.54 To explain its choice not to follow the
precedent set by the Supreme Court of the United States, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court wrote that, "unlike the United States Supreme Court, this court
has considered pretextual arrests to be unreasonable for over twenty
years."55 The court then made it clear that it was breaking with federal ju-
risprudence:
Today, we solidify our position, based on the adequate and
independent state grounds of Article 2, section 15, of the Arkansas
Constitution, as well as our own pretext decisions. Under these
authorities, pretextual arrests-arrests that would not have oc-
curred but for an ulterior investigative motive-are unreasonable
police conduct warranting application of the exclusionary rule.56
Two years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court again broke with federal
precedent and expanded the rights of home dwellers confronted with a pro-
posed consent-to-search form by law enforcement officers.57 Agents of a
drug task force had received anonymous tips that a small child inside the
50. 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002).
51. Id. at 649,74 S.W.3d at 216.
52. Id. at 656, 74 S.W.3d at 221.
53. Id. at 656-57, 74 S.W.3d at 221. The Arkansas Supreme Court had initially held
that it was granting Sullivan more protection under the United States Constitution than the
federal courts had done. Sullivan v. State, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000). But this
decision was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court of the United States for the rea-
son that state courts cannot expand federal constitutional rights beyond what the Supreme
Court of the United States has afforded. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 777 (2001).
54. State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. at 655-56, 74 S.W.3d at 221 (2002).
55. Id. at 652, 74 S.W.3d at 218.
56. Id, at 655-56, 74 S.W.3d at 221.
57. See State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004).
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trailer home of the defendants had become sick due to drug manufacturing.58
When approaching the home, the agents smelled a chemical odor.5 9 They
knocked on the door and a woman answered.' ° The officers advised her that
they had information that marijuana was being grown on the premises and
other drug offenses were occurring on the premises.61 The officers pre-
sented the woman with a consent-to-search form, which she signed.62 The
form did not include a statement that she could refuse the search; nor did the
officers advise her of this.63 Once inside the home, officers saw evidence of
drug offenses. 64 Based on this evidence, they obtained a search warrant,
arrested the defendants, and seized the evidence supporting involvement
with illegal drugs. 65 At the ensuing suppression hearing, the circuit court
suppressed the seized evidence as an unreasonable search and seizure be-
cause of the failure by law enforcement officers to tell the home dweller that
she could refuse to consent to a search.66
The State argued on appeal that the Arkansas Constitution does not re-
quire police officers to advise home dwellers that they have the right to re-
fuse consent to a search.67 The supreme court disagreed and held that the.
circuit judge correctly construed the Arkansas Constitution. 6' The supreme
court went further and discussed the "knock and talk" procedure employed
by law enforcement: "It is the intimidation effect of multiple police officers
appearing on a home dweller's doorstep, sometimes in uniform and armed,
and requesting consent to search without advising the home dweller of his or
her right to refuse consent that presents the constitutional problem.,
69
The supreme court also emphasized in Brown that it was not bound by
the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when interpreting the
Arkansas Constitution.7° The court added that it would "break with prece-
dent when the result is patently wrong and so manifestly unjust that a break
becomes unavoidable."71 In holding as it did, the court underscored Arkan-
sas's longstanding and steadfast adherence to the sanctity of the home and
protection against unreasonable government intrusions. The Brown decision
58. Id. at 463, 156 S.W.3d at 724.
59. Id., 156 S.W.3d at 724.
60. Id., 156 S.W.3d at 724.
61. Id., 156 S.W.3d at 724.
62. Id., 156 S.W.3d at 724.
63. Brown, 356 Ark. at 463, 156 S.W.3d at 724.
64. Id. at 464, 156 S.W.3d at 725.
65. Id., 156 S.W.3d at 725.
66. Id. at 465, 156 S.W.3d at 725.
67. Id., 156 S.W.3d at 725.
68. Id. at 474, 156 S.W.3d at 732.
69. Brown, 356 Ark. at 466, 156 S.W.3d at 726.
70. Id. at 467, 156 S.W.3d at 727.
71. Id. at 473, 156 S.W.3d at 731.
2012]
UALR LAW REVIEW
placed Arkansas within a distinct minority of jurisdictions that afforded the
same protection.
C. Term Limits for Members of Congress
The issue confronting the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1994 was
whether term limits should be imposed on members of the United States
Congress and the Arkansas General Assembly as well as other state offi-
cials.72 The court struck down term limits for members of Congress,73 and
the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that decision by a vote of
five to four.74 In that same opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld
term limits for state constitutional officers and legislators.75
Amendment 73 was the amendment to the Arkansas Constitution under
review.76 Proposed as an initiated Act and approved overwhelmingly by the
people of this state at the General Election on November 3, 1992, it pro-
vided a limit of two terms for state constitutional officers, including the
.Governor; three terms for state representatives; and two terms for state sena-
tors.77 Beyond that, amendment 73 provided that representatives in Con-
gress who had been elected to three or more terms as a member of the U.S.
House of Representatives were not eligible to appear on the ballot for an-
other election to that position.78 Likewise, any person who had been elected
to two or more terms as a U.S. Senator was not eligible to appear on the
ballot for election to the U.S. Senate.79
A complaint was filed in circuit court to invalidate amendment 73 on
several grounds, one of which was that it violated both the Arkansas Consti-
tution and the United States Constitution by adding an additional qualifica-
tion for state officers and legislators and for congressional candidates as
well.8° That qualification, of course, was the number of terms already
served.
The new qualification set out in amendment 73 was upheld by the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court for state officials but invalidated for federal legisla-
tors. 81 In striking down any limit on terms to be served by federal legisla-
tors, the court observed that these representatives and senators speak to na-
72. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994).
73. Id. at 266, 872 S.W.2d at 357.
74. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
75. Hill, 316 Ark. at 270, 872 S.W.2d at 359.
76. Id. at 255, 872 S.W.2d at 357.
77. Id. at 255-56, 872 S.W.2d at 351-52.
78. Id., 872 S.W.2d at 351-52.
79. Id., 872 S.W.2d at 351-52.
80. Id. at 258, 872 S.W.2d at 352-53.
81. Hill, 316 Ark. at 270, 872 S.W.2d at 357.
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tional issues and that any additional restrictions to federal candidacy im-
posed by the states could create variances in uniformity and lead to differ-
ences among the states with respect to who can sit in Congress. 82 By hold-
ing as it did, the Arkansas Supreme Court set the stage for an affirmance by
the Supreme Court of the United States, which used the same rationale. 3
One can only speculate on how different our Congress would be with a
mandatory limit for terms of service and a revolving membership.
D. Public Education
In 2001, Pulaski County Circuit Judge Collins Kilgore found, among
other woefully bad education statistics, that almost fifty-eight percent of
Arkansas's high school graduates required remediation courses in English or
math once they got to college. Based on this finding and others manifesting
clear educational deficiencies, it was obvious that public education in Ar-
kansas was grossly defective, inadequate, and not functioning suitably, as
the Arkansas Constitution required. This led to the Lake View saga, which
consumed more than a decade in Arkansas courts and resulted in multiple
major opinions from the Arkansas Supreme Court.84 The issue throughout
the litigation was whether the General Assembly had enacted school-
funding legislation for Arkansas's public schools that complied with the
Education Amendment of the Arkansas Constitution, which requires an
equal and adequate education for students across the state."
The saga actually began in 1994 when Pulaski County Chancery Judge
Annabelle Clinton86 ruled that Arkansas's public-funding system was un-
constitutional under the Arkansas Constitution and that the General Assem-
bly had two years to correct it. 7 New funding statutes were enacted in
1995, and in November 1996, amendment 74 to the Arkansas Constitution
82. Id. at 265, 872 S.W.2d at 356.
83. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 779-80 (1995)..
84. The following are the "Lake View" cases: Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of
Phillips Cnty. (Lake View 1), 323 Ark. 693, 917 S.W.2d 530 (1996); Lake View Sch. Dist.
No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee (Lake View I1), 340 Ark. 481, 10 S.W.3d 892 (2000);
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee (Lake View 111), 351 Ark. 31, 91
S.W.3d 472 (2002); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee (Lake View
IV), 358 Ark. 137, 189 S.W.3d 1 (2004); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v.
Huckabee (Lake View V), 364 Ark. 398, 220 S.W.3d 645 (2005); Lake View Sch. Dist. No.
25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee (Lake View VI), 370 Ark. 139, 257 S.W.3d 879 (2007).
85. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 provides as follows: "Intelligence and virtue being the
safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free and good government, the State shall ever
maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools and shall adopt all
suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education."
86. Judge Annabelle Clinton later became Justice Annabelle Clinton Imber and is now
Annabelle Imber Tuck.
87. Lake View 1, 323 Ark. at 694-95,917 S.W.2d at 531-32.
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was adopted by a vote of the people.88 That amendment provided that a
uniform property tax of twenty-five mills would be assessed for the mainte-
nance and operation of the public schools in all school districts." In 1997,
the General Assembly enacted additional legislation in an attempt to comply
with Judge Clinton's ruling and the requirements of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion.9° That legislation and amendment 74 were again challenged in state
court in 1997, and Judge Kilgore found that the challenges to Arkansas's
public-education formula were moot due to the adoption of amendment 74
and the legislation.9
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and directed in Lake View II that
a "compliance trial" be held on whether there had been compliance with
Judge Clinton's 1994 order.92 On remand, a compliance trial was con-
ducted, and Judge Kilgore ruled that despite amendment 74, the public-
school funding system still was inadequate and unequal under the Arkansas
Constitution. 9' Following an appeal, the supreme court affirmed Judge
Kilgore's ruling in a forty-page opinion in Lake View 111.9' The court held
that the State of Arkansas had an "absolute duty" under amendment 14 of its
constitution to educate its children and that the State had failed to do so.
95
Further, the court held that funding available for public education varied
from school district to school district and, thus, the ultimate education made
available to students across the state was disparate and unequal.96
The court also looked to the actual money spent in the various school
districts on education per student to determine equality. Seeing the disparity
in the actual money spent, the court found a corresponding inequity in edu-
cational opportunity. In Lake View III, the court concluded that it was the
State's responsibility-not the local school districts'-to provide an equal
education to all students and one that was adequate as well. 97
The mandate issued following the Lake View III decision, after which
significant legislation to rectify the Arkansas education system was passed
by the General Assembly. The question still remained as to whether public
education passed constitutional muster. On January 22, 2004, the supreme
court recalled its mandate due to allegations that there was a lack of compli-
88. Lake View 1I, 340 Ark. 481, 485-86, 10 S.W.3d 892, 894-95.
89. Id. at 486-87, 10 S.W.3d at 895.
90. Id. at 487-88, 10 S.W.3d at 896.
91. Id. at 492, 10 S.W.3d at 899.
92. Id. at 494-95, 10 S.W.3d at 900.
93. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee (Lake View 1ff), 351 Ark.
31, 45, 91 S.W.3d 472, 479 (2002).
94. Id. at 42, 91 S.W.3d at 477.
95. Id. at 71-72, 91 S.W.3d at 495.
96. Id. at 79, 91 S.W.3d at 500.
97. Id. at 72-79, 91 S.W.3d at 495-00.
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ance with Lake View 11.98 The court also appointed two Masters to evaluate
the State's compliance with the court's decision.99 In the interim, the gover-
nor called a special session of the General Assembly to address educational
deficiencies further. The Masters reported to the court, and the court held in
Lake View IV, that the General Assembly had now taken "laudable" steps to
comply with Lake View III and that legislative acts, including a $2.1 billion
appropriation, evidenced the legislature's intent to make education a prior-
ity.'0° The court held that the State was now in compliance with amendment
74. The court added, however, that although consolidation of school dis-
tricts was not mandated, if adequacy was not attained by the acts passed,
"more efficient measures to afford that adequacy will be inevitable."' 0 ' The
mandate issued.
On June 9, 2005, the supreme court recalled its mandate a second time,
after a petition was filed, and reappointed the same two Masters to evaluate
once more legislation enacted by the General Assembly to bring the State
into compliance. °2 In a subsequent opinion, Lake View V, the supreme
court held that the General Assembly had failed to comply with some of its
own legislation passed in the Second Extraordinary Session of 2004, which
required adequacy hearings before each legislative session.'0 3 Issuance of
the mandate was stayed until December 1, 2006.'04
On November 30, 2006, the issuance of the mandate was stayed for an
additional 180 days so that the Masters could file a supplemental report on
any constitutional deficiencies, including a report on facilities, equipment,
and teacher pay.0 5 The subsequent Masters report confirmed that the Gen-
eral Assembly had enacted the necessary legislation to achieve adequacy
and equality, as the constitution required, and that a framework for our im-
proved public-education system was in place. 0 6 The court adopted the Mas-
ters report and ruled the Arkansas education system constitutional. 
07
98. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee, 355 Ark. 617, 142
S.W.3d 643 (2004).
99. The two masters appointed were former Arkansas Supreme Court Chief Justice
Bradley Jesson and former Arkansas Supreme Court Justice David Newbern. Lake View
Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee (Lake View IV), 358 Ark. 137, 140, 189
S.W.3d 1, 3 (2004).
100. Lake View IV, 358 Ark. at 158-60, 189 S.W.3d 15-16.
101. Id. at 157, 189 S.W.3d at 14.
102. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee, 362 Ark. 521-23, 210
S.W.3d 28-30 (2005).
103. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee (Lake View V), 364 Ark.
398, 415, 220 S.W.3d 645, 657 (2005).
104. Id. at 415-16, 220 S.W.3d at 657.
105. Lake View VI, 370 Ark. at 139-40, 257 S.W.3d at 879.
106. Id. at 145, 257 S.W.3d at 883.
107. Id. at 145-46, 257 S.W.3d at 883.
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The end result of the multiple Lake View decisions was that the State of
Arkansas by dint of its supreme court decisions and the ultimate work of the
legislative and executive branches of government made epic leaps forward
toward enhancing educational opportunities for all of the children of this
state. Now, Arkansas is an acknowledged leader among the fifty states for
its commitment to education and the progress made in providing compre-
hensive education to all of its students.108
E. Special and Local Legislation
When can the General Assembly enact legislation that arbitrarily bene-
fits one person, place, or thing or legislation that applies to only one geo-
graphic area of the State? The short answer is never according to amend-
ment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution because that amendment expressly
precludes such special or local legislation. 9 The clear catalyst for the
amendment was to prevent pork-barrel projects benefitting only one group
of people or one locality. The key to a violation is whether the legislative
action is arbitrary.l 0
Two cases in the last twenty years dramatically illustrate the parame-
ters of the special-and-local legislation proscription. The earlier of the two,
McCutchen v. Huckabee, dealt with the Alltel (now Verizon) Arena in North
Little Rock."'
McCutchen challenged the constitutionality of Act 739 of 1995,
wherein the General Assembly appropriated $20 million for the construction
of a multipurpose civic center in North Little Rock, Pulaski County. ll2 He
alleged that Act 739 constituted special and local legislation in violation of
amendment 14."l3 The trial court disagreed and concluded that the General
Assembly rationally decided that a civic center located in Pulaski County
would enhance tourism, recreation, and economic development for the entire
state, and therefore the legislation withstood constitutional scrutiny. 1 4 The
supreme court agreed." 5
The court recognized in McCutchen that it had repeatedly held that
merely because "a statute ultimately affects less than all of the state's terri-
108. See, e.g., Amy M. Hightower, Weighing States' School Performance, Policymaking,
EDUCATION WEEK, Jan. 13, 2011, available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/01/1 3/16stateofthestates.h30.htmltkn=QMBFexNk
gmIADQ8yy46XOFWBPjrxalSWYHzJ&cmp=clp-ecseclips.
109. ARK. CONST. amend. XIV.
110. McCutchen v. Huckabee, 328 Ark. 202, 208, 943 S.W.2d 225, 227 (1997).
111. Id. at 205, 943 S.W.2d at 226.
112. Id., 943 S.W.2d at 226.
113. Id. at 208, 943 S.W.2d at 227.
114. Id. at 206-07, 943 S.W.2d at 226-28.
115. Id. at 213, 943 S.W.2d at 230.
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tory[, this alone] does not necessarily render it local or special legisla-
tion." ' 6 Instead, the court pointed out that it had "consistently held that an
act of the General Assembly that applies only to a portion of this state is
constitutional if the reason for limiting the act to one area is rationally re-
lated to the purpose of that act."' 7 Hence, in McCutchen, the issue was
whether there was a rational basis for Act 739, which provided for construc-
tion in only one county in the state." 8
The court agreed with the trial court that the purpose of Act 739 was to
make funds available for the construction of a multipurpose civic center that
would "increase tourism, recreation, and economic development for all of
the state."" 9 The court then cited the reasons for selecting Pulaski County
as the regional location: (1) Pulaski County is the most populous county in
the state; (2) it is centrally located; and (3) it is the seat of the government. 20
These reasons, the court held, were not arbitrary and capricious. 2 ' The
court, in sum, found that the decision to construct the civic center in Pulaski
County was "rationally related to the intended purposes of Act 739" and,
thus, was not local legislation.
22
To the opposite effect was Wilson v. Weiss. 123 This case involved an
appeal from multiple orders entered by the Pulaski County Circuit Court
regarding multiple acts passed by the General Assembly in the 2005 legisla-
tive session to benefit specific legislative districts throughout the state.
24
The plaintiff claimed, in effect, that all of these acts in the 2005 session
were pork-barrel projects and constituted special and local legislation in
violation of amendment 14.125
The supreme court considered only one act, Act 1898 of 2005, relating
to a $400,000 appropriation for infrastructure, sewer, and streets in the City
of Bigelow. 26 The circuit court had declined to rule that this act was special
legislation. 27 The plaintiff, however, urged on appeal that there was no
legitimate reason for selecting the City of Bigelow for special treatment in
receiving taxpayer funds for these listed purposes and that the legislation
violated amendment 14.128
116. McCutchen, 328 Ark. at 208, 943 S.W.2d at 227.
117. Id. at 208, 943 S.W.3d at 227.
118. Id. at 209, 943 S.W.2d at 228.
119. Id., 943 S.W.2d at 228.
120. Id., 943 S.W.2d at 228.
121. Id., 943 S.W.2d at 228.
122. McCutchen, 328 Ark. at 209, 943 S.W.2d at 228.
123. 368 Ark. 300, 245 S.W.3d 144 (2006).
124. Id. at 301, 245 S.W.3d at 146.
125. Id., 245 S.W.3d at 146.
126. ld. at 306-07, 245 S.W.3d at 148-49.
127. Id. at 306, 245 S.W.3d at 148-49.
128. ld. at 306-07, 245 S.W.3d at 149.
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The supreme court initially noted that because Act 1898 clearly applied
only to the City of Bigelow, the question was whether a rational and legiti-
mate reason supported the application of this appropriation to benefit one
community in the state. 129 The City of Bigelow argued that the use of a
tiered funding system, whereby an individual member of the General As-
sembly could justify an appropriation through the General Improvement
Fund in order to fill certain funding gaps left in his or her respective juris-
diction, was a completely reasonable method by which legislators might
meet their legitimate public duty of "constructing, maintaining, and operat-
ing a transportation network" in the state. 30
The supreme court disagreed and wrote in Wilson that the reasons set
out to justify the $400,000 appropriation to the City of Bigelow for "infra-
structure, sewer, and streets" could be advanced by numerous towns, cities,
and communities throughout the state and that there was no rational basis
related to a legitimate state purpose presented to the court to justify singling
Bigelow out for special treatment. 3 ' In countering the circuit court's rea-
soning that the appropriation would advance tourism for the state, the su-
preme court said that "[a]ny community located in some proximity to a park
or tourist attraction could claim comparable needs. If Act 1898 is allowed
to stand, the result would be that amendment 14's prohibition against special
and local legislation would be swallowed by exceptions premised on 'safety
and tourism."",132 The court concluded that Act 1898 ran afoul of amendment
14 and, in doing so, enforced a time-honored principle in the Arkansas Con-
stitution.133
F. Amendment 80
1. Superintending Control
With amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution, which became effec-
tive January 2, 2001, came the express declaration that the Arkansas Su-
preme Court had superintending control over all of the courts of the state.
1 34
The supreme court invoked this express authority in the case of Foster v.
Hill, handed down in 2008.131
129. Wilson, 368 Ark. at 308, 245 S.W.3d at 151.
130. Id. at 309, 245 S.W.3d at 151.
131. Id., 245 S.W.3d at 151.
132. Id., 245 S.W.3d at 151.
133. Id. at 310, 245 S.W.3d at 152.
134. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 4.
135. 372 Ark. 263, 275 S.W.3d 151 (2008).
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In Foster, a young man was shot and killed by a West Memphis Police
officer.'36 The sitting prosecutor asked for the appointment of a special
prosecutor, which was done by the circuit judge in Division 3 of the Second
Judicial Circuit. 37 The special prosecutor submitted a report to the Division
3 judge, finding insufficient evidence to charge the police officer. 138
Six days later, the judge in Division 6 of the same judicial circuit called
a special grand jury to investigate the killing.139 The previously appointed
special prosecutor petitioned the supreme court for a writ of certiorari hold-
ing that Division 6 had no authority to call the grand jury, because Division
3 had already exercised jurisdiction over the matter.'4°
The supreme court issued the writ and observed in its opinion that un-
der the common law rule of concurrent jurisdiction, Division 6 had no au-
thority to act after the Division 3 judge had taken action in the case. Divi-
sion 6, in addition, was not assigned criminal cases under that judicial cir-
cuit's administrative plan. As a final point, under the supreme court's au-
thority to provide superintending control under amendment 80, the court
deemed issuance of the writ to be appropriate to promote jurisdictional cer-
tainty in the judiciary.
The Foster case and its progeny have been essential to assuring order
within the court system. The decision presents a graphic example of what
was intended by vesting superintending authority in the supreme court under
amendment 80.
2. Separation of Powers
Amendment 80 also set down markers on rule-making authority vested
in the supreme court and, specifically, whether the supreme court or the
legislature had the authority to prescribe rules of procedure for the courts.14 1
The amendment reads that the supreme court prescribes these procedural
rules, provided that they do not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right."'142 What must be read in conjunction with amendment 80 are the pro-
visions in the Arkansas Constitution establishing three separate and distinct
departments of government and limiting the exercise of power to each
department. 43
136. Id. at 264 n.1, 275 S.W.3d at 152 n.1.
137. Id. at 265, 275 S.W.3d at 153.
138. Id., 275 S.W.3d at 153.
139. Id., 275 S.W.3d at 153.
140. Id. at 265-66, 275 S.W.3d 153.
141. See ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 3.
142. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 3.
143. ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Defining which legislative matters are procedural and which are sub-
stantive has been an ongoing mission for the supreme court, both prior to
amendment 80 and thereafter. For example, in Weidrick v. Arnold, which
was pre-amendment 80, the supreme court held that the rule of civil proce-
dure governing commencement of litigation superseded a sixty-day statutory
notice requirement mandated by the General Assembly in medical malprac-
tice cases."4 In Summerville v. Thrower, which was post-amendment 80,
the court, in the same vein, struck down a statutory requirement that a plain-
tiff file a reasonable-cause affidavit within thirty days of filing a medical
malpractice complaint.'45
Illustrative of the difficulty in delineating procedural versus substantive
matters post-amendment 80 is Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., where
the judicial and legislative branches clashed over whether the liability and
resulting damages of nonparties could be determined by juries and deducted
from the judgments awarded to plaintiffs.'46 At issue was a provision of the
Civil Justice Reform Act, which authorized such nonparty determinations
and deductions and which opponents contended invaded the province of the
supreme court regarding its power to adopt rules of civil procedure. 47 The
federal district court certified the question of separation of powers to the
supreme court for resolution."'
The supreme court answered the certified question by holding that the
legislature had impermissibly established its own procedure to establish the
fault of a nonparty, which is a matter that falls within the procedural baili-
wick of the supreme court. 149 The court concluded:
Because the nonparty provision is procedural, it offends the
principle of separation of powers and the powers specifically pre-
scribed to this court by amendment 80. Accordingly, we hold that
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-202 violates separation of powers under
article 4, § 2, as well as amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas
Constitution. 0
On a second question related to proof of damages under a provision of
the same Civil Justice Reform Act, the court ruled that this too violated the
separation of powers and amendment 80 because the admissibility of evi-
dence regarding medical costs falls squarely within the procedural domain
of the supreme court. 5 '
144. 310 Ark. 138, 146, 835 S.W.2d 843, 848 (1992).
145. 369 Ark. 231,239, 253 S.W.3d 415,421 (2007).
146. 2009 Ark. 241, 1-2, 308 S.W.3d 135, 138 (2009).
147. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to 16-55-220 (Supp. 2003).
148. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to 16-55-220 (Supp. 2003).
149. Johnson, 2009 Ark. at 8-9, 308 S.W.3d at 141-42.
150. Id. at 9, 308 S.W.3d at 142.
151. Id. at 10-11, 308 S.W.3d at 142.
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A second separation-of-powers case is Department of Human Services
and Child Welfare Agency Review Board v. Howard.5 2 In Howard, the al-
leged infringement occurred by Regulation 200.3.2 adopted by the Child
Agency Review Board, which is part of the executive branch. The regula-
tion provided that "no person may serve as a foster parent if any adult mem-
ber of that person's household is a homosexual."'
153
The supreme court held that Regulation 200.3.2 violated the separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine in that it encroached on the powers of the General
Assembly. 5 4 The court concluded that the General Assembly had provided
the Review Board only with authority to enact rules and regulations that
promoted the health, safety, and welfare of children, and that there was no
correlation between the blanket exclusion of homosexuals from fostering
and the health, safety, and welfare of foster children.5 5 The underlying pur-
pose of the regulation, the court stated, was morality, based upon the
Board's own standard of morality and biases. 56 The court ultimately found
that the Board's enactment of Regulation 200.3.2 was an attempt to legislate
morality, which was outside the scope of its authority. 57 Because of this,
the court held that Regulation 200.3.2 was a violation of the separation-of-
powers doctrine.
58
In a 2011 case, State v. A.G., the supreme court held that Rule 3(a) of
the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure-Criminal, which limited
interlocutory criminal appeals by the State of Arkansas to three categories,
superseded a legislative act that allowed State appeals in juvenile-transfer
matters.'59 Again, the reasoning of the supreme court was that Rule 3(a) was
procedural and, thus, the last word on interlocutory appeals'6r  As such,
Rule 3(a) excluded any additional right of the State to appeal proclaimed by
the General Assembly.' 6' The legislative act, according to the court, in-
vaded the province of the supreme court. 16
2
What is patently clear from these decisions is that the supreme court
has always jealously guarded its authority to establish procedural rules for
our courts. Such authority was memorialized in amendment 80 and will
continue to be a battleground issue.
152. 367 Ark. 55, 238 S.W.3d 1 (2006).
153. Regulation 200.3.2 of the Minimum Licensing Standards for Child Welfare Agen-
cies as cited in Howard, 367 Ark. at 58, 238 S.W.3d at 3.
154. Howard, 367 Ark. at 66, 238 S.W.3d at 8-9.
155. Id. at 65, 238 S.W.3d at 7.
156. Id., 238 S.W.3d at 7.
157. Id. at 66, 238 S.W.3d at 8.
158. Id., 238 S.W.3d at 8.
159. 2011 Ark. 244, S.W.3d .
160. Id. at 5-6, S.W.3d at__
161. Id., _S.W.3d at
162. Id., S.W.3d at .
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The same is true of the court's authority to rule legislative acts uncon-
stitutional under the Arkansas Constitution. Recently, in Bayer Cropscience
LP v. Shafer, the court held that the legislative act to cap punitive-damage
awards contravened the Arkansas Constitution's protection against limiting
the amount to be recovered for injuries to persons or property. 163
G. Freedom of Speech and the Press
Three cases stand out as examples of the length the supreme court will
go to safeguard freedom of the press against prior restraints and to protect
against impingement of free speech under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article 2, section 6 of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion.
The case of Arkansas Democrat-Gazette v. Zimmerman concerned a
gag order on the press issued by a juvenile judge."" Members of the media
petitioned the supreme court for a writ of mandamus directing the judge to
revoke her gag order, which prohibited the media from disseminating the
names and photographs of the victim and the victim's family as well as the
juvenile defendant and the juvenile defendant's family. 165 The judge also
prohibited the media from distributing pictures of juveniles who were pre-
sent in the courthouse or entering or leaving the courthouse. 166 The gag or-
der arose from the publication of the name and yearbook photograph of the
juvenile defendant and the publication of the names of his parents and the
name and employment of the victim. 167
After the gag order was orally issued, a reporter for the Arkansas De-
mocrat-Gazette newspaper told a photographer from the Democrat-Gazette
that the judge had issued the gag order. 68 Later that day, the photographer
took pictures of the juvenile's parents outside the courthouse and of the ju-
venile leaving the courthouse with a coat over his head. 69 The Democrat-
Gazette published the pictures the next day. 70 The judge held the Democ-
rat-Gazette in contempt of court and fined the newspaper $100 for violating
the gag order. 7 ' After that, the media petitioned the Arkansas Supreme
Court for extraordinary relief.17 1
163. 2011 Ark. 518, S.W.3d at _
164. 341 Ark. 771, 20 S.W.3d 301 (2000).
165. Id. at 774, 20 S.W.3d at 302-03.
166. Id. at 774-75, 20 S.W.3d at 302-03.
167. Id., 20 S.W.3d at 302-03.
168. Id. at 775, 20 S.W.3d at 303.
169. Id., 20 S.W.3d at 303.
170. Zimmerman, 341 Ark. at 775, 20 S.W.3d at 303.
171. Id. at 776, 20 S.W.3d at 304.
172. Id. at 777, 20 S.W.3d at 304.
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The supreme court held in Zimmerman that a writ of certiorari was the
appropriate remedy because the issue before the court was whether the
judge's action in gagging the media violated the freedom of press and was
on its face a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion in excess of
her authority.173 The supreme court then held that the judge's gag order was
too broad and constituted a prior restraint on the media.174 The court em-
phasized the importance of a constitutionally protected free press and main-
tained that any restraint on freedom of the press will be subject to the closest
scrutiny.175
The court reasoned, in addition, that the judge could have closed the
proceedings under her statutory authority but chose not to do so.'76 Fur-
thermore, under Administrative Order Number 6, the judge had the authority
to exclude photographs in areas immediately adjacent to her courtroom, but
the court recognized that the scope of Administrative Order Number 6 did
not include public streets and sidewalks. 77 The supreme court also noted
that once the juvenile proceedings had been opened to the public, there was
no overriding state interest that would warrant an injunction against photo-
graphing the juvenile and the others leaving the courthouse. For all of these
reasons, the writ of certiorari issued.'78
Similarly, the supreme court held in 2006 in Helena Daily World v.
Simes that a circuit judge could not issue a restraining order to prohibit the
publication of testimony given by a witness in open court.'79 The testimony
at issue was given by a witness concerning an improper ex parte conversa-
tion by the judge and the complaint he filed with the Arkansas Judicial Dis-
cipline and Disability Commission because of that conversation.18 Among
those restrained from communicating this testimony was a reporter from the
local newspaper, the Helena Daily World."
The supreme court found the judge's order to be a prior restraint on
freedom of the press. 82 It noted that the conversation sought to be re-
strained had been relayed in open court and was already in the public do-
main."83 The court further emphasized the heavy presumption that prior
restraints of the press are invalid despite a statute providing that probable-
173. Id. at 779, 20 S.W.3d at 305.
174. Id. at 786, 20 S.W.3d at 310.
175. Id. at 780, 20 S.W.3d at 306.
176. Zimmerman, 341 Ark. at 784-85, 20 S.W.3d at 309.
177. Id. at 785-86, 20 S.W.3d at 309-10.
178. Id. at 786, 20 S.W.3d at 310.
179. 365 Ark. 305,229 S.W.3d 1 (2006).
180. Id. at 306-07, 229 S.W.3d at 2.
181. Id., 229 S.W.3d at 2.
182. Id. at 311-12, 229 S.W.3d at 5-6.
183. Id. at 309, 229 S.W.3d at 3-4.
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cause proceedings in Judicial Discipline cases shall be confidential. 184 The
court stated that balanced against the heavy presumption against prior re-
straints, this confidentiality must yield. 85 The supreme court granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari.
186
In a third case not involving prior restraint-albeit one with First
Amendment significance-a letter of admonishment was issued by the Ar-
kansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission that declared remarks
made by then Court of Appeals Judge Wendell L. Griffen to members of the
Arkansas General Assembly to be a violation of then Canon 4(C)(1) of the
Judicial Code.'87 The case came to the Arkansas Supreme Court by way of a
petition for writ of certiorari from Judge Griffen on the grounds that the
Commission had exceeded its authority in admonishing the judge. 1
88
The speech in question occurred when Judge Griffen appeared before
the Arkansas Legislative Black Caucus in a public meeting called to discuss
the dismissal of University of Arkansas basketball coach Nolan Richard-
son.'89 Judge Griffen, as an African American, described his involvement
with the University of Arkansas as a college and law school student and his
further involvement as president of the university's Black Alumni Soci-
ety.' 9' He traced the history of African American involvement with the uni-
versity and illuminated his concern about the disparate treatment afforded to
black students, faculty, and employees compared to whites, which, he as-
serted, culminated in the firing of Coach Richardson.' 9' Judge Griffen
called upon the legislators to engage in economic retaliation against the uni-
versity during the legislative session.' 9
These and other comments by Judge Griffen relating to Coach Richard-
son's firing and connecting the firing to racism appeared in several national
and statewide newspapers. 93 The issue was brought to the attention of the
Judicial Discipline Commission when it received three complaints about
Judge Griffen's public comments. 1 4 The Commission investigated the con-
troversy and eventually voted to issue a letter of admonishment to Judge
184. Id. 311-12, 229 S.W.3d at 5-6.
185. Simes, 365 Ark. at 312, 229 S.W.3d at 5-6.
186. Id. at 312, 229 S.W.3d at 6.
187. Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 355 Ark. 38, 44, 130
S.W.3d 524, 527 (2003). Canon 4(C)(1) has since been amended. See Ark. Code Judicial
Conduct R. 3.2(c) (2011).
188. Griffen, 355 Ark. at 48, 130 S.W.3d at 530.
189. Id. at41, 130 S.W.3d at 525-26.
190. Id. at41-42, 130 S.W.3d at 525-26.
191. Id., 130 S.W.3d at 525-26.
192. Id. at 42-43, 130 S.W.3d at 526-27.
193. Id. at 45, 130 S.W.3d at 528.
194. Griffen, 355 Ark. at 43, 130 S.W.3d at 527.
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Griffen on the grounds that Canon 4(C)(1) of the Judicial Code was vio-
lated.1 95 Canon 4(C)(1), as it then existed, read:
A judge shall not appear at a public hearing before, or other-
wise consult with, an executive or legislative body or official ex-
cept on matters concerning the law, the legal system or the ad-
ministration of justice or except when acting pro se in a matter in-
volving the judge or the judge's interests. 196
The supreme court issued the writ of certiorari and quashed the admon-
ishment letter.'97 In doing so, the court ruled that Canon 4(C)(1) had not
been "narrowly tailored" or sufficiently drawn to place Judge Griffen on
notice as to what was the proscribed conduct concerning "the judge's inter-
ests" under the canon. 98 The court also found that the canon implicated the
First Amendment and that its vagueness prevented the canon from passing
muster under a strict-scrutiny analysis.' 99 The court said:
Without a standard established in the "judge's interest" ex-
ception to Canon 4(C)(1) to guide Judge Griffen on what is a
proper area of comment to the legislative officials, we are hard-
pressed to find a violation of the canon. And without proof of a
"narrow tailoring" of the exception by the Judicial Commission
when the parameters of speech based on conduct are directly in-
volved, Canon 4(C)(1), as applied to Judge Griffen, violates his
First Amendment rights.200
H. Usury
For decades, Arkansas toed a strict line regarding its usury laws with
the benchmark fixed by the Arkansas Constitution at ten percent per an-
num.20 ' That changed when the people voted to raise the usury limit under
the constitution to five percent above the Federal Discount Rate,22 and the
usury limit was changed again just recently by a vote of the people, with a
maximum interest rate on loans and contracts not to exceed seventeen per-
cent per annum. 2
°3
195. Id. at45--46, 130 S.W.3d at 528-29.
196. Id. at 44-45, 130 S.W.3d at 528 (citing Ark. Code Judicial Conduct Canon 4(c)(1)).
197. Id. at 61, 130 S.W.3d at 538.
198. Id. at 60, 130 S.W.3d at 538.
199. Id. at 60-61, 130 S.W.3d at 538.
200. Griffen, 355 Ark. at 60, 130 S.W.3d at 538.
201. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIX.
202. ARK. CONST. amend. LX.
203. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIX.
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One effort to bypass the prior usury limit took the form of the Check-
Cashers Act passed by the General Assembly in 1999.204 This act provided
a "deferred presentment option" under which "customers" would write a
personal check to the check-cashers business for the amount of cash to be
advanced plus fees. °5 The business would advance the customer the face
amount of the check less the fees.2 °6 The customer could then repurchase
the check at a later time, allow it to be cashed, or roll it over by payment of
another fee.207
In a spate of litigation over the act, the question raised was whether the
cash advanced was a loan and whether the fees paid constituted interest. If
the answer was yes to both questions, the transactions in many, if not all
cases, would be usurious based on the fees paid. The supreme court ulti-
mately held that the transactions were loans and that the fees paid were in-
terest. 20 8 Because the record reflected interest rates under the sample con-
tracts ranging from 168.20% to 558.71%, the supreme court had no problem
ruling that the Check-Cashers Act was unconstitutional, because it con-
209flicted with the usury provision of the Arkansas Constitution.
In holding as it did, the supreme court again sent a strong message that
it would look to the substance of a transaction regardless of the terminology
used in the law or contract to decide whether the usury law had been vio-
lated. This guiding principle has steered the supreme court for decades and
continues to do so.
I. Recalling the Mandate in Death Cases
Two cases in particular illustrate that the Arkansas Supreme Court af-
fords a higher level of scrutiny to defendants on death row to assure that a
miscarriage of justice has not been perpetrated before an execution. In the
first case, State v. Robbins, the defendant, Robert Robbins, pled guilty to
murdering a young woman. 2'0 He then waived his right to counsel and re-
quested the death penalty.21' He was convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death. The mandate issued.21 2
204. ARK. CODEANN. §§ 23-52-101 to 23-52-117 (Repl. 2011).
205. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-52-102(5) (Supp. 2007).
206. See, e.g., McGhee v. Arkansas State Bd. Of Collection Agencies, 375 Ark. 52, 59-
60, 289 S.W.3d 18, 24 (2008).
207. Id. at 60, 289 S.W.3d at 24-25.
208. Id. at 61-62, 289 S.W.3d at 25-26.
209. Id. at 63, 289 S.W.3d at 27.
210. 342 Ark. 262, 264, 27 S.W.3d 419, 419 (2000).
211. Id. at 267, 270, 275 S.W.3d 422-23.
212. Id. at 267, 275 S.W.3d at 422.
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After a filing by Robbins's mother, as next friend, resulted in a stay of
execution, the supreme court declared that the law required an automatic
review of the record in all death-penalty cases for prejudicial error regard-
less of a guilty plea.213
Following that review, an affirmance by this court, and the issuance of
the mandate, Robbins petitioned to reopen his case based on an alleged error
that occurred in the jury's completion of the sentencing forms. 2 4 Robbins
argued that the supreme court's previous decision in Willett v. State 15 re-
quired a resentencing trial since the sentencing forms in that case were un-
clear as to whether the jury found any mitigating circumstances before sen-
tencing Willett to death.216 According to Robbins, this same error occurred
in his case and had been overlooked by previous counsel appointed by the
court to handle his case.217
The supreme court agreed that the federal standard of review of avoid-
ing a miscarriage of justice should be applied in Robbins's case in deciding
whether to recall the mandate.218 The court further determined that recalling
a mandate is equal to reopening a case and that should be done in Robbins's
case due to the unique circumstances in connection with the mitigation sen-
tencing form.2'9 The court also agreed that the Robbins case was very simi-
lar to the Willett case and noted that the federal district court had dismissed
Robbins's habeas corpus petition, because this issue surrounding mitigating
circumstances had not yet been addressed in state court.220 The court under-
scored that this was a death-penalty case, and, as such, demanded a higher
level of scrutiny.22t The court concluded that recalling the mandate was a
unique circumstance not to be repeated.222
Despite this admonition in Robbins about non-repetition, that is pre-
cisely what occurred in a later case. In Lee v. State, Ledell Lee was con-
victed of the 1993 capital murder of a female victim and was sentenced to
death.223  His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, 4
213. Id. at 264, 275 S.W.3d at 420 (citing State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 5 S.W.3d 51
(1999)). In 2001, the court adopted an amendment to Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 10, which
establishes automatic appeals and mandatory review in death cases. In re: Amendment to
Rule 10 of Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure Criminal, 345 Ark. Appx. 671 (2001).
214. Robbins v. State, 353 Ark. 556, 557, 114 S.W.3d 217, 218 (2003).
215. 322 Ark. 613,911 S.W.2d 937 (1995).
216. Robbins, 353 Ark. at 557-58, 114 S.W.3d 218-19.
217. Id., 114S.W.3dat218-19.
218. Id. at 563, 114 S.W.3d at 222.
219. Id. at 563-64, 114 S.W.3d at 222.
220. Id. at 564, 114 S.W.3d at 222.
221. Id., 114 S.W.3d 222-23.
222. Robbins, 353 Ark. at 564, 114 S.W.3d at 223.
223. 327 Ark. 692, 696, 942 S.W.2d 231, 232-33 (1997).
224. Id at 696, 942 S.W.2d at 232-33.
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after which he filed a petition for post-conviction relief on grounds of inef-
fective assistance of counsel.225 The circuit court denied his petition, and
this court affirmed.226
Later, Lee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court.227 The district court held the petition in abeyance to allow Lee to seek
relief in state court, because Lee had raised sua sponte the issue of the im-
pairment of his defense counsel due to intoxication during the Rule 37 hear-
ing.228 The State appealed that decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and that court affirmed the district court's decision to hold the case in
abeyance pending a state-court determination. 9
Lee next moved the Arkansas Supreme Court to recall its mandate and
reopen his post-conviction hearing. 30 In his motion, he repeated his claim
that his Rule 37.5 counsel had been impaired by alcohol during the Rule 37
proceedings, and thus, was ineffective.231 Rule 37 counsel admitted that he
was indeed impaired at that time.
232
The supreme court agreed.233 In its analysis, the court looked at three
factors in deciding whether to recall the mandate, which were the same fac-
tors set forth in the Robbins opinion: "1) the presence of a defect in the ap-
pellate process; 2) a dismissal of proceedings in federal court because of
unexhausted state claims; and 3) .. .a death case that required heightened
scrutiny. ' '134 On the first issue, the court held that the intoxication and im-
pairment of Lee's counsel constituted a defect because of the exacting re-
quirements of Rule 37.5 regarding qualified and competent counsel.235 The
court further held that the federal district court's holding the case in abey-
ance satisfied the second condition under Robbins, and, finally, that the
heightened level of scrutiny required for death cases was applicable. 6 The
court granted the motion to recall the mandate and ultimately granted Lee a
237
new Rule 37 hearing.
A third case, Collins v. State,238 took a different tack. In Collins, the
defendant had failed to verify his petition for Rule 37 relief.239 The supreme
225. Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 709, 38 S.W.3d 334, 339 (2001).
226. Id., 38 S.W.3d 339.
227. Lee v. Norris, 354 F.3d 846, 847 (8th Cir. 2004).
228. Id. at 847-48.
229. Id. at 850.
230. Lee v. State, 367 Ark. 84, 86, 238 S.W.3d 52, 53 (2006).
231. Id., 238 S.W.3d at 53.
232. Id. at 87, 238 S.W.3d at 54.
233. Id. at 93, 238 S.W.3d at 57-58.
234. Id. at 88, 238 S.W.3d at 54-55.
235. Id., 238 S.W.3d at 55.
236. Lee, 367 Ark. at 88-89, 238 S.W.3d at 55.
237. Id. at 93, 238 S.W.3d at 57-58.
238. 365 Ark. 411, 231 S.W.3d 717 (2006).
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court held that the failure to show that qualified counsel for post-conviction
relief had been appointed and the failure of the defendant to verify his Rule
37 petition evidenced a breakdown in post-conviction procedures in this
death case. 240 The court reversed the denial of the Rule 37 petition seeking a
new trial and remanded the case to the circuit court for the appointment of
counsel who qualified under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.5.241
New counsel was granted leave to file a second petition for postconviction
relief.24
2
One further comment needs to be made about Robbins. The Robbins
opinion, though a death case and uncited, was precedent for the Arkansas
Supreme Court when it twice recalled its mandate in the Lake View cases
discussed above.
J. Class Actions
Two cases were handed down by the supreme court in 1997 that em-
phasized the criteria for certifying a class action under Arkansas Rule of
Civil Procedure 23. The first was Mega Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Jacola,243
which involved 400 insureds under Mega Life's health insurance coverage
and which raised the question of whether the policies issued were group or
individual policies.244 The second case was Seeco, Inc. v. Hales,245 which
concerned 3000 gas-royalty owners who sought a class certification based
on allegations that the gas producers fraudulently withheld gas-royalty pay-
246
ments.
In Mega Life, the trial court certified a class using the criteria under
Rule 23 and found that the alleged class was sufficiently numerous, that a
common injury of paying void coverage was involved, that the common
issue predominated over individual issues, and that a bifurcated process
could be employed first for a finding of a common wrong and second to
decide individual damages.247 In its holding, the supreme court declined to
use the federal standard of a rigorous analysis to decide whether common
issues predominated, as the dissent advocated, and instead held that allega-
tions of wrongdoing asserted in the complaint sufficed.24 '
239. Id. at 413-15, 231 S.W.3d at 718-19.
240. Id., 231 S.W.3d at 718-19.
241. Id. at413-16, 231 S.W.3d at 718-19.
242. Id. at415-16, 231 S.W.3d at 720.
243. 330 Ark. 261, 954 S.W.2d 898 (1997).
244. Id. at 265-67, 954 S.W.2d at 899-00.
245. 330 Ark. 402, 954 S.W.2d 234 (1997).
246. Id. at 404, 954 S.W.2d 235.
247. 330 Ark. at 270-73, 954 S.W.2d at 901-903.
248. Id. at 276-280, 954 S.W.2d at 905-907 (Thornton, J. dissenting).
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In Seeco, a common scheme to defraud 3000 royalty owners was al-
leged.249 The circuit court certified the class, and the supreme court affirmed
on the basis that an overarching fraudulent scheme had been alleged, which
predominated over individual defenses raised by Seeco.25° After the deci-
sion was made on the central claim, the court stated that individual defenses
against individual class members such as lack of reliance or diligence could
be brought in a separate proceeding, if necessary.21' Again, the fact that a
common wrong was alleged was decisive as opposed to whether that allega-
tion could survive a rigorous analysis by the court at the certification stage,
as the dissent claimed. 2
In Fraley v. Williams Ford Tractor & Equipment Company,25 a class-
action case decided two years later, the supreme court emphasized that a
circuit court should not delve into the merits of affirmative defenses raised
by the defendant financing company against the alleged class of debtors at
the class-certification stage to determine the number of class members. 54
That the merits of the alleged common wrong alleged by class members and
the defenses raised by the defendant cannot be examined as part of the Rule
23 analysis has now become an article of faith in Arkansas's class-
certification jurisprudence.
Arkansas has, thus, rejected the federal standard of rigorously analyz-
ing claims and defenses at the class-certification stage.2 5  The supreme
court, instead, looks to the allegations of wrongdoing.256 Any defenses
against individual class members can be resolved in a bifurcated proceed-
ing.257 If the class action proves unmanageable, the circuit court can always
decertify the class. 58
K. Dramshop Laws
Prior to 1997, Arkansas had long adhered to the principle that selling
alcoholic beverages to consumers was not the proximate cause of a resulting
accident.259 In 1997 and 1999, that changed when the supreme court handed
down two cases that looked to the public policy of the state, as established
249. 330 Ark. at 404, 954 S.W.2d at 235.
250. Id. at 412-14, 954 S.W.2d at 240-41.
251. Id. at 413-414, 954 S.W.2d at 240-41.
252. Id. at 415, 954 S.W.2d at 241 (Thornton, J. dissenting).
253. 339 Ark. 322, 5 S.W.3d 423 (1999).
254. Id. at 335-37, 5 S.W.3d at 431-33.
255. See id., 5 S.W.3d at 431-32.
256. See id. at 344-46, 5 S.W.3d at 432-38.
257. See id., 5 S.W.3d at 432-38.
258. See id. at 347, 5 S.W.3d at 439.
259. See Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 890, 385 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1965) overruled by
Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy 337 Ark. 24, 34, 986 S.W.2d 410, 415 (1999).
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by the General Assembly, in connection with the sale of alcoholic beverages
to minors and to extremely intoxicated people.26
In Shannon v. Wilson, the court examined the criminal statutes that
prohibited the sale of alcohol to minors and concluded that they created a
legal duty and imposed a high standard of care on alcohol licensees to pro-
tect minors. 2 1 A breach of that duty, the court held, could lead to vendor
liability, because the sale of alcohol to minors as well as the resulting con-
sumption qualified as joint proximate causes.262 In light of this, violation of
the criminal statutes could be presented to the jury as evidence of negligence
on the part of the vendors in selling the alcoholic beverages.263
In Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy, an alcohol vendor was sued after alco-
hol was sold to a man who was extremely intoxicated and who evidenced an
intention to drive his vehicle. 2' The Arkansas Supreme Court extended its
ruling in Shannon and held that evidence of alcohol sales by a licensed ven-
dor to a visibly intoxicated person, in violation of a misdemeanor statute,
was some evidence of negligence. 265 The court's reasoning, again, was
based on its finding that the statute established a duty of care against sales
by licensed vendors to intoxicated persons.266 The court said:
Among the prohibited practices in the Arkansas Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act is the sale of alcohol "to a habitual drunk-
ard or an intoxicated person," which is a misdemeanor. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 3-3-209 (Repl. 1996). When we read this statute in
conjunction with Act 695, it is clear to us, as it was in Shannon v.
Wilson .... that the General Assembly has spoken on this point
and has established a high duty of care on the part of holders of
alcohol licenses, which includes the duty not to sell alcohol to
high-risk groups, including intoxicated persons. Stated in a dif-
ferent way, a duty of care exists on the part of licensed alcohol
vendors not to endanger the public health, welfare, or safety, and
that duty is breached when vendors sell alcohol to intoxicated per-
sons in violation of § 3-3-209.267
The General Assembly subsequently used the Shannon and Jackson
decisions as the basis for legislation-Act 1596 of 1999-that encompassed
260. See Jackson, 337 Ark. 24, 986 S.W.2d 410; Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 947
S.W.2d 349 (1997).
261. Shannon, 329 Ark. at 160-61, 947 S.W.2d at 357-58.
262. Id., 947 S.W.2d at 357-58.
263. Id., 947 S.W.2d at 357-58.
264. Jackson, 337 Ark. at 26, 986 S.W.2d at 411.
265. Id. at 29, 986 S.W.2d at 412-13.
266. Id., 986 S.W.2d at 412-13.
267. Jackson, 337 Ark. at 29, 96 S.W.2d at 413.
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these holdings and established a duty of care and liability against alcohol
vendors.268 The decisions present an important scenario where
the court evaluated its common law in light of legislative changes,
which established a duty of care in alcohol vendors, and opted to overrule its
prior authority.
L. Workers' Compensation Jurisdiction
In VanWagoner v. Beverly Enterprises,269 the issue was which forum-
the circuit court or the Workers Compensation Commission-had jurisdic-
tion to decide a work-related injury.270 An employee alleged that she had
suffered injuries resulting from a slip-and-fall at work.27' She originally
filed a claim for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission, but
this claim was controverted by her employer, and a claim representative
ruled that her claim was not compensable.272 A hearing before the commis-
sion on the issue of compensability was scheduled, but the employee instead
requested that the hearing be cancelled, and she filed suit in circuit court
against her employer. 3 The circuit court dismissed the action under the
exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.274 The
question before the Arkansas Supreme Court then became whether the cir-
cuit court or the commission had jurisdiction to determine the jurisdictional
question of whether an employee's injuries were covered by the Workers'
Compensation Act or could be litigated in circuit court.275
In previous holdings, the court had consistently followed the rule that
the circuit courts and the commission had concurrent jurisdiction to deter-
mine the applicability of workers' compensation laws in a given case; how-
ever, this had resulted in problems.276 The court explained:
One practical result of this rule is that the party that acts first in-
evitably decides which tribunal will resolve the jurisdictional
question.
268. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-126-101.
269. VanWagoner v. Beverly Enterprises, 334 Ark. 12, 970 S.W.2d 810 (1998).
270. Id. at 13, 970 S.W.2d at 811.
271. Id., 970 S.W.2d at 811.
272. Id. at 13-14, 970 S.W.2d at 811.
273. Id., 970 S.W.2d at 811.
274. Id., 970 S.W.2d at 811.
275. VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 811.
276. Id., 970 S.W.2d at 811.
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In addition to creating a race to file, the concurrent-jurisdiction
approach can lead to duplicative litigation, that is, the simultane-
ous pursuit of claims in both the commission and in circuit
court.
27 7
Accordingly, the court in 1998 decided to change the rule. The court
said: "We believe that the better rule is to recognize the administrative law
rule of primary jurisdiction and to allow the Workers' Compensation Com-
mission to decide whether an employee's injuries are covered by the Work-
ers' Compensation Act. This rule is consistent with the purpose of the Act
,,278
Following VanWagoner, it has been the commission that has had sole
jurisdiction to decide whether it had exclusive jurisdiction over such claims,
and the race to circuit court has been eliminated. The procedure has now
been streamlined and potentially cumbersome jurisdictional problems
avoided in a multitude of workers' compensation cases.
M. Residency Requirement for Constitutional Officers
In 2006, an Arkansas voter challenged the eligibility of Bill Halter, a
candidate for Lieutenant Governor, to run for that office on the basis that he
failed to meet the seven-year residency requirement under article 6, section
5 of the Arkansas Constitution.2 79 The voter sought a declaratory judgment
of ineligibility in circuit court and a writ of mandamus removing Halter
from the ballot.280 The circuit court denied that relief.
281
In affirming the denial of the voter's petition, the supreme court first
observed that the voter had appropriately raised a pre-election attack on eli-
gibility. 82 The next issue was the meaning of the phrase, "resident of this
state," in article 6, section 5.283 The court concluded that this was really a
matter of the intention of the person involved.284 Focusing on the findings
of the circuit court, the supreme court emphasized in particular Halter's vot-
ing in Arkansas, his Arkansas driver's license, and his filing Arkansas in-
come tax returns.285 Though he was physically out of state at various times,
the proof did not show an intent to leave the state permanently. 86 In addi-
277. Id., 334 Ark. at 14, 970 S.W.2d at 811-12.
278. Id. at 15, 970 S.W.2d at 812.
279. Clement v. Daniels, 366 Ark. 352, 353, 235 S.W.3d 521, 522-23 (2006).
280. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 522-23.
281. Id. at 354, 235 S.W.3d at 523.
282. Id. at 354-55, 235 S.W.3d at 523-24.
283. Id. at 335, 235 S.W.3d at 524.
284. Id. at 358-59, 235 S.W.3d at 526.
285. Clement, 366 Ark. at 358-59, 235 S.W.3d at 526.
286. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 526.
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tion, the court found that Halter never abandoned Arkansas as his residence
for a new domicile.2 87 Because of this lack of abandonment, Halter satisfied
the seven-year residency requirement.288
N. Illegal Exactions
Article 16, section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution reads: "Any citizen
of any county, city or town may institute suit, in behalf of himself and all
others interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against the enforcement
of any illegal exactions whatever."
Article 16, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution further provides that
"no county shall levy a tax to exceed one-half of one percent for all pur-
poses." In 1993, the voters of Jefferson County approved a one-cent sales
tax.289 In Foster v. Jefferson County Quorum Court, a Jefferson County
taxpayer filed suit, contending that the one-cent sales tax was an illegal tax,
or illegal exaction, as prohibited by article 16, section 13.290 The circuit
court rejected that claim, and the taxpayers appealed to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court.291
The Arkansas Supreme Court first reversed the circuit court and held
that the one-cent sales tax was an illegal exaction that violated article 16,
section 9.292 On rehearing, however, the court shifted its vote and affirmed
the circuit court.293 In doing so, the court looked to the history of article 16,
section 9 and concluded that the tax restriction only related to ad valorem
property taxes and not to the sales tax. 294 The sales tax was not enacted until
1935, the court pointed out, which was sixty-one years after the 1874 Ar-
kansas Constitution was adopted. 295 The mischief to be remedied in 1874
was high property taxes-not the sales tax, which had not yet come into
291existence. Moreover, the court asserted, other sections of article 16 all
related to property taxes.297 Accordingly, the court held that article 16, sec-
tion 9 did not fix a limit on the county's ability to levy a sales tax. 298
287. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 526.
288. Id., 235 S.W.3d at 526.
289. Foster v. Jefferson County Quorum Court, 321 Ark. 105, 107, 901 S.W.2d 809, 810
(1995).
290. Id., 901 S.W.2d at 810.
291. Id., 901 S.W.2d at 810.
292. Id., 901 S.W.2d at 810.
293. Id. at 116H, 901 S.W.2d at 818.
294. Id. at 116E, 901 S.W.2d at 818.
295. Foster, 321 Ark. at 116E, 901 S.W.2d at 816.
296. See id., 901 S.W.2d at 816-17.
297. Id. at 116F-G, 901 S.W.2d at 816-17.
298. Id., 901 S.W.2d at 816-17.
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The significance of the Foster opinion on rehearing is that the court
looked not only to the plain language of article 16, section 9, but also to the
historical context of that constitutional provision. It also examined other tax
sections within article 16, as part of its analysis. The far reaching conse-
quences of this sales tax authority in the counties cannot be overstated.
In a second illegal-exaction case of significance, McGhee v. Arkansas
State Board of Collection Agencies,299 the issue was whether an illegal-
exaction suit filed on behalf of check cashers against a publicly funded state
board could survive.3°° The supreme court looked to the Sovereign Immu-
nity Clause of the Arkansas Constitution, article 5, section 20, which reads:
"The State of Arkansas shall never be made a Defendant in any of her
Courts. '' 3°1 While acknowledging that the immunity provision usually pro-
tects state boards and agencies like the Board of Collection Agencies against
suit, the court held that the illegal-exaction section of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion, as the more specific section, controlled over the immunity section.02
Because an illegal exaction had been pled, sovereign immunity did not per-
tain.303
0. In Loco Parentis
The doctrine of in loco parentis has been recognized in Arkansas for
grandparents, and even stepparents, who occupied the role of parents, but
the supreme court had never extended the doctrine to same-sex partners who
were parenting a child. This changed with the case of Bethany v. Jones.3 4
In Bethany, one partner had conceived the child by artificial insemina-
tion, and then, while that partner returned to work, the other partner stayed
at home as the primary caregiver. 30 5 The two partners separated, and the
former stay-at-home partner sought visitation, which was denied by the cus-
todial partner .3' The former stay-at-home partner sued for visitation. The
circuit court granted visitation, reasoning that the doctrine of in loco parentis
applied. 7
On appeal, the supreme court focused on the relationship between the
child and the person asserting an in loco parentis status and agreed that the
299. 360 Ark. 363,201 S.W.3d 375 (2005).
300. Id. at 367, 201 S.W.3d at 376-77.
301. Id. at 372-73, 201 S.W.3d at 380.
302. Id., 201 S.W.3d at 380.
303. Id., 201 S.W.3d at 330.
304. 2011 Ark. 67, S.W.3d
305. Id. at 1-2, S.W.3d at __
306. Id. at 2-3, S.W.3d at __
307. Id. at 6-7, S.W.3d at .
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doctrine applied. °8 The question next to be resolved was a factual one relat-
ing to the relationship between the child and the person who invoked the
doctrine and sought visitation.
Using the facts found by the circuit court, the supreme court concluded
that the partner seeking visitation was a parent figure and did, in fact, stand
in loco parentis. 3'0 As a final point, the court addressed whether her visita-
tion was in the best interest of the child. This question too was resolved in
favor of the noncustodial parent who had initially been the primary care-
giver for the child.31' For the first time in Arkansas, the supreme court rec-
ognized the right of a same sex domestic partner to stand in the place of a
natural parent and be afforded visitation privileges.
P. Freedom of Information
Two decisions in the same case were handed down in 2007 that con-
cerned the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and whether in
camera review by a circuit judge was required before e-mails involving a
Pulaski County employee could be disclosed as public records.3 12 The pre-
cise issue was whether all e-mails between a Pulaski County comptroller
and a contractor with whom he was having an alleged sexual relationship
were subject to disclosure upon demand by a newspaper before a judicial
determination of whether they were public records was made.
3
'
3
In the first case, Pulaski County had released some but not all of the e-
mails on the basis that the undisclosed e-mails were private." 4 The circuit
judge, without reviewing the undisclosed e-mails, concluded that they were
public records under the FOIA and ordered their release. 35 The newspaper,
on appeal, argued this ruling was correct because there is a statutory pre-
sumption found in the FOIA that the records are public.31 6
308. The court noted that "[i]t was undisputed that [Jones] was the stay-at-home mom for
over three years who took care of [the child]. [The child] called her mommy. She thought of
Jones's parents as her grandparents and spent holidays with Jones's family. The parties' inten-
tions were always to co-parent, until Bethany unilaterally determined she no longer wanted to
allow Jones to have visitation." Id. at 11-12, -S.W.3d at __
309. Id., S.W.3d at__
310. Bethany, 2011 Ark. at 12, _S.W.3dat .
311. Id. at 12-13, S.W.3dat .
312. See Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc. (Pulaski County 1), 370 Ark.
435, 438, 260 S.W.3d 718, 720 (2007); Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc. (Pu-
laski County 11), 371 Ark. 217, 264 S.W.3d 465 (2007).
313. Pulaski County II, 371 Ark. at 220, 264 S.W.3d at 467.
314. Id. at 218-19, 264 S.W.3d at 466-67.
315. Id., 264 S.W.3d at 466-67.
316. Pulaski County 1, 370 Ark. at 437, 260 S.W.3d at 719; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-
103(5)(A) (Supp. 2005).
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Following an appeal by Pulaski County, the supreme court remanded
the matter to the circuit judge for an in camera review of the content of the
e-mails to discern whether the alleged sexual relationship was intertwined
with the business relationship or purely personal.317 The review was a re-
quired first step, the court stated, before a public-records determination
could be made.3"8
After performing that in camera review, the circuit judge again ordered
the release of the e-mails as public records, save for six photographs, which
the court determined were sexually explicit." 9 A second appeal came to the
supreme court, raising the question of whether the circuit judge had fol-
lowed this court's mandate to review all e-mails in question.30 The supreme
court held that the circuit judge had reviewed the e-mails for content and
had followed the court's mandate; thus, the circuit judge's order was af-
firmed. 321' The import of these two FOIA cases is that under the facts of this
case, an in camera review by the circuit judge was required to determine the
character of the disputed e-mails-whether personal or business related-
prior to their release to the press. A simple demand by the press for the in-
formation is not determinative under Arkansas's FOIA.
III. CONCLUSION
The decisions discussed in this article are but a sampling of significant,
and in some cases landmark, decisions handed down by the Arkansas Su-
preme Court. The cases discussed, however, are not exhaustive, and other
articles, no doubt, will be written about other cases of equivalent signifi-
cance. These decisions, nevertheless, underscore the quality of the supreme
court's work and evidence the impact our court has had over the past two
decades on both the state's jurisprudence and the nation's as well.
317. Pulaski County !, 370 Ark. at 445-46, 260 S.W.3d at 725-26.
318. Id. at446, 260 S.W.3d at 725.
319. Pulaski CountylH, 371 Ark. at 218-19, 264 S.W.3d at 466-67.
320. Id. at 221,264 S.W.3d at 468.
321. Id. at 221-22, 264 S.W.3d at 468.
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